Patent protection, imitation and the mode of technology transfer by Fosfuri, Andrea
Patent protection, imitation and the mode of technology
transfer
*Andrea Fosfuri
´Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economı a de la Empresa, Calle Madrid 126,
28903 Getafe Madrid, Spain
Abstract
This paper analyzes a model in which a fir endowed with a new technology can choose
between exports, licensing and direct investment as entry modes in a foreign market. I
endogenize the vintage of the transferred technology and allow for imitation by the licensee.
Subsidiary production and exports circumvent imitation but involve higher costs for the
innovating firm The fir can strategically use the vintage of the technology to deter
imitation by the licensee. As a result, transfers to affiliate might be of later vintage than
technologies sold to outsiders. Through modificatio of the imitation costs, the host
country’s system of patent protection influence the mode of technology transfers which in
turn affects the welfare of the recipient economy.
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1. Introduction
The issue of protection of intellectual property rights is attracting interest in
trade negotiations (for instance, during the Uruguay Round under the GATT a
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common set of international intellectual property rights has been proposed) and the
increasing attention of trade economists (e.g. Helpman, 1993).
This growing interest has two important motivations. First, inadequate protec-
tion of intellectual property generates huge losses to firm involved in international
investments. A study by USITC (1988) for a relatively large sample of US
multinationals shows that worldwide losses due to infringement of property rights
can be estimated to be close to $25 billion per annum. Second, it seems that the
patent protection system of a country might influenc the mode of technology
transfers by foreign investors which in turn could affect the growth strategies of
the recipient economy. For instance, Gould and Gruben (1996), using cross-
country data, fin a positive relationship between their measure of patent
protection within a country and the growth rate.
1Though technology diffusion might also occur when an innovation is exploited
internally by the innovating fir itself, it is widely believed among business
circles that the likelihood of technology diffusion is larger when arm’s length
agreements are chosen for the commercialization of a new technology. For
instance, data compiled from questionnaires show that managers of US multina-
tionals fin it systematically more secure to transfer their state-of-the-art technolo-
gy to a wholly-owned subsidiary rather than to a licensee (see Lee and Mansfield
1996). Therefore, a weak patent protection system may provide an internalization
motive for foreign direct investment: a wholly-owned subsidiary in the recipient
country is supposed to circumvent imitation. The argument applies mutatis
mutandis to the exports which might also be used as a strategy against imitation
and technology diffusion.
Empirical evidence shows that firms while deciding their entry mode in a
foreign country, are also concerned with the type of technology to be transferred.
Mansfiel and Romeo (1980) analyze the behavior of 31 US firm involved in the
transfer of technology overseas. They show that ‘the mean age of the technologies
transferred through licenses, joint ventures, and channels other than subsidiaries
tends to be higher than the mean age of the technologies transferred to
subsidiaries’. Similar finding in McFetridge (1987), Mansfiel (1994) and Lee
and Mansfiel (1996) suggest that transfers to affiliate tend to be of a later
vintage than technologies sold to outsiders.
This paper provides a possible explanation to the stylized facts presented above.
In particular, I argue that the described patterns of international technology
transfers might be the result of firms strategic behavior aimed to protect
proprietary technology from imitation. I show that the decisions about the entry
mode in a foreign country and the vintage of the transferred technology are
1Throughout the paper I refer to technology diffusion as the situation where the technology becomes
available to more than one fir located in the foreign country. Imitation is the channel through which
technology diffusion takes place.
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interrelated and that both decisions are influence by the degree of patent
protection in the recipient country.
To this end, I build a model in which technology brought in by foreign investors
might diffuse to local firm through an imitation process, which only occurs if a
2licensing contract has been signed. Subsidiary production and exports circumvent
imitation by local competitors. (I discuss this assumption in Section 4.) Conform-
ing to the empirical findings I show that in equilibrium the patent holder might
transfer a less efficien version of its technology precisely to reduce the incentives
3of the licensee to imitate. I also identify conditions under which imitation takes
place. In particular, I fin that in equilibrium technology diffusion occurs when the
so-called ‘joint profit effect is small and patent protection is weak.
Finally, I show that, through modificatio of imitation costs, the host country
system of patent protection influence both the mode of technology transfers and
the vintage of the transferred technology. A change in the strength of patent
protection might induce a regime shift with welfare consequences for the recipient
country. The striking result is that welfare is not a monotonic function of patent
protection and that both weak and strong protections are preferred to intermediate
levels.
The literature studying the entry mode of a fir endowed with a new technology
into a foreign market has focused on comparing the costs entailed in the different
alternatives. (See Markusen (1995) for a survey.) In particular the emphasis has
been put on explaining the rationale for making a foreign direct investment
(Ethier, 1986): since operating a business abroad is costly, why firm do not
stipulate arm’s length agreements for the commercialization of their technology?
It has been argued that arm’s length contracts, such as licensing, carry costs as
well. In particular, these costs might be due to asymmetric information (see papers
by Ethier, 1986; Wright, 1993; Horstmann and Markusen, 1996) or to premature
diffusion of technology due to imitation. My paper, in contrast, focuses exclusive-
ly on the latter source of costs. Ethier and Markusen (1996), who also analyze
entry modes in the presence of imitation, argue that a fir must choose between
costly exporting and the possible dissipation of its proprietary asset. My paper
differs from theirs in several respects. Most importantly, the innovating fir not
2 Familiarity with the technology is a necessary condition for successful imitation. The paper more
aptly applies to process technologies than product technologies, since imitation can only occur after
using the technology, as opposed to imitation from simple observation of the product or from reading
the patent disclosure.
3 The strategic argument put forward in the paper is not the only possible explanation to the stylized
fact that technologies transferred to subsidiaries are newer than technologies sold to outsiders. For
instance, another explanation relies on a transaction-cost argument. Standard technologies are easier to
contract upon because they need less assistance by the licensor, in general they do not require the
transfer of know-how (which might give rise to moral-hazard problems) and their value is better known
by the licensee.
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only chooses the mode of entry, but also the vintage of the technology to be
4transferred. Indeed, the choice of the vintage of the technology becomes a
strategic instrument used to deter imitation by the recipient firm
This mechanism of using the vintages of the technology to avoid imitation is
similar to the one proposed by Rockett (1990) where vintages (or equivalently in
her paper, qualities) as well as royalties and fixe fees are used by the innovating
fir to extract rents from the licensee. My model differs from Rockett’s in that the
licensor and the licensee do not compete in the same market. Further, in addition
to explicitly analyzing the entry mode, I allow the strength of patent protection to
vary continuously as opposed to Rockett’s analysis of three discrete patent
protection regimes. Thus, my paper expands both on the entry mode analysis of
Ethier and Markusen and on the vintage analysis of Rockett.
The next section presents the model and shows the main results, Section 3
derives the relationship between degree of patent protection and welfare in the host
country, Section 4 discusses the robustness of the results and Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. The model
The model is based on a partial equilibrium framework where there are two
countries: the home or source country (H ) and the foreign or host country (F ). In
country H there exists a fir (fir h) which has developed and patented a new
process technology. This has occurred prior to the game and it is exogenously
given in the model. Patent protection is assumed to be effective in country H, so I
focus on actions taking place in the foreign country.
For simplicity, I consider a game where there are only two periods and where
5the intertemporal discount factor is set equal to one.
Firm h can extract additional rents from its technology either by exporting the
fina product to the foreign market, or by investing directly in country F, where the
new process technology has not yet been introduced, or by licensing the
technology to a local firm I assume that there are many potential recipient firm in
country F.
Firm h holds a continuum of technologies, all suitable to produce the same
6 ¯product. Each technology is characterized by a parameter a [ [a, a ], which stands]
for the ‘age’ or the efficienc level of the technology. A lower value of a implies a
4 I depart from Eithier and Markusen in two other respects: I assume that imitation is costly to the
licensee and successful imitation necessarily requires the stipulation of a licensing agreement.
5 For instance, because afterwards a new technology is introduced making the present technology
completely obsolete. Section 4 briefl discusses how results would change in an infinite-horizo setting.
6One can rationalize this assumption by thinking that the process technology has been continually
improved, so older and newer versions are available. The insight provided by the paper would hold if
only a discrete number of technologies is available to fir h.
4
newer or more advanced —hence more efficien —technology (for instance, with
lower production costs). Firm h can choose, at zero cost, which version of the
technology to license to the foreign fir or to use for its direct investment (or for
its production at home).
Foreign direct investment involves a fixe cost G, while a licensing contract
does not. The fixe cost G captures the penalties of operating across national and
cultural boundaries (e.g. scarce knowledge of business practices, language and
laws), which are not borne by domestic firm (Hymer, 1976). Implicitly I assume
that technology transfer is costless (see discussion in Section 4).
As for licensing, I examine exclusive contracts with lump sum payments which,
7indeed, turn out to be optimal in the present setting. Royalty fees reduce the total
8profit extractable from the licensee, but not the incentives to imitate. Section 4
discusses the case where only royalty fees are available to the licensor.
Lump sum payments (T and T ) are made at the beginning of each period. In a1 2
licensing contract, neither the licensor nor the licensee can commit to a two-period
agreement. An enforceable commitment would rule out imitation in this setting.
Notice that, though no commitments to long-term strategies, for instance two-
period contracts with punishment clauses, are explicitly considered, their effects
9could be captured in the present framework simply by increasing imitation costs.
In the firs period, a local fir can produce only by signing a licensing
agreement with fir h. In the second period, production by a local fir can also
take place because of technology diffusion due to imitation.
Though imitation only occurs if a licensing contract is signed with the patent
holder in the firs period, this is not an automatic outcome and the licensee has to
undertake an investment in order to achieve it. Imitation costs, denoted by I(P, a),
10where P > 0 stands for the degree of patent protection in the country, include
applied research, pilot plant and prototype construction, investment in plant and
equipment, and all the costs of ‘inventing around’ the licensor’s patent (see
Mansfiel et al., 1981). After imitation has occurred, the licensee holds in a
7An exclusive contract rules out the possibility for the patent holder to license its technology to
many licensees in the same geographical market. The empirical evidence suggests that exclusive
contracts are quite widespread in business practices.
8 It has been shown (Rockett, 1990) that a royalty could be used in a licensing contract when the
licensee and the licensor are competitors in the same market. The licensor can extract additional rents
from a new technology without strengthening the rival’s position.
9Notice that imitation costs would have to be specifie as endogenous if they were to be used to
capture costs from punishment or other long-term strategies.
10 The traditional literature on patent design formally distinguishes between scope and length of the
patent (e.g. Matutes et al., 1996). Though here patents are unidimensional, one can think that patent
length is set to infinit (patent expiration would not allow imitation by non-licensees since imitation
requires by assumption familiarity with the technology), with the single dimension of the patent being
the scope. And as in Gallini (1992), the scope of the patent can be thought of as the costs of developing
a non-infringing imitation. Further, since there is no issue of early expiration of the patent on an older
vintage technology, vintages are equivalent to qualities as in Rockett (1990).
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proprietary way the version of the technology it has received in the firs period.
Imitation costs are a function of the age of the technology which has been licensed
and of the degree of patent protection.
MNotation. Denote by P (a) the gross monopoly rents in period t 5 1, 2 earned byt
Many fir which produces directly in country F. Similarly, let P (a) be theE,t
monopoly profit when exports are chosen to supply the foreign market. Finally,
D
P (a , a ) are the duopoly profit in period 2 of fir i 5 h, f competing againsti,2 i j
fir j 5 h, f, j ± i, where a and a are the ages of the technologies usedi j
respectively by fir i and j. The subindex f identifie the firs period licensee
which, in the second period, competes in the market using the version of the
technology it has imitated.
In solving the game I make use of the following assumptions:
M MA1: P (a). P (a), ;t, a.t E tM D DA2: P (a)> P (a , a )1 P (a , a ), ;a , a .2 i,2 i j j,2 i j i j]
A3: Profi functions are continuous, twice differentiable and strictly decreas-
ing in the age of the own technology. Duopoly profit are continuous, twice
differentiable and strictly increasing in the age of the rival’s technology.
D ¯A4: P (a, a)5 0.f,2 ]A5: [≠I(P, a) /≠a]< 0; [≠I(P, a) /≠P]. 0; I(P, a). 0, ;a, P.
Assumption A1 states that exporting implies some inefficiencie which make
this strategy less profitabl than producing directly in country F. For instance, this
might be due to the existence of transportation costs or to the presence of wage
inequalities between the two countries which make the production in F cheaper.
By A2 industry profit are maximized by a monopolist endowed with the newest
technology. Typically, the industrial organization literature says that the ‘joint
profit effect or ‘efficiency effect holds when the monopolist’s profit are larger
than the sum of the duopolists’ profits A3 is a plausible assumption: the newer the
technology, the larger the profit a fir can earn by using it (for example, because
it allows for a more efficien use of inputs or increases the quality of the fina
product). On the other hand, the older the technology used by the rival, the larger
the profit of the firm A4 states that a local fir endowed with the oldest
technology makes zero profit when competing with a rival endowed with the
newest technology. Put differently, the newest technology is a drastic innovation
with respect to the oldest one. Finally, A5 says that imitation costs are decreasing
in the age of the technology to be copied and increasing in the degree of patent
11protection in the foreign country. Moreover, imitation costs never drop to zero
even for the oldest technology or in the case of no patent protection in F.
Fig. 1 shows the tree of the game. At t 5 0 fir h makes the firs period
11Mansfiel et al. (1981) report that relatively less important innovations are imitated at a lower cost
and that the estimated increase in imitation costs due to patent protection is about 11%.
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Fig. 1. The tree of the game.
internationalization decision. It simultaneously chooses one of the three possible
entry modes and the age of the technology used or licensed. If licensing is chosen,
lump sum fees are paid by the licensee. At t 5 1 firs period profit are realized. If
the technology has been licensed, the licensee decides whether to pay the imitation
costs and hence copy the technology, or not. Then, fir h makes the second period
internationalization decision and lump sum fees are paid by the licensee if a
licensing contract is signed. At t 5 2, second period profit are realized.
I solve the game by backward induction. Notice that the second period
internationalization decision by fir h is straightforward. Since imitation is not an
issue in the second period and technology transfer is costless, fir h always
12chooses to license the newest technology to a local firm This reduces the number
of different potential equilibria (regimes) to five
12Except when it has directly invested in the firs period: in this case it is indifferent between
producing with its own affiliat and licensing the technology to another firm
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1. EXP regime: fir h exports in the firs period and licenses the technology to
a local fir in the second period. Imitation is excluded by assumption.
2. FDI regime: fir h creates a subsidiary and produces directly in country F in
both periods. Again, imitation is excluded by assumption.
3. LICNEW regime: fir h licenses the technology in both periods. It always
transfers the newest technology, but imitation does not occur.
4. LICOLD regime: fir h licenses the technology in both periods. It transfers
an older version of the technology in the firs period and imitation does not take
place.
5. LICIMI regime: fir h licenses the technology in the firs period. The
licensee imitates the technology and produces on its own in the second period.
Firm h transfers the technology to another fir in the second period.
In what follows, I firs compute fir h’s profit under different regimes and then
compare them in order to establish under which conditions a particular regime
arises at equilibrium.
2.1. The FDI and EXP regimes
A wholly-owned subsidiary in the host country is a credible (self-enforcing)
commitment to one foreign partner in both periods. Put differently, the employees
of a subsidiary cannot quit after the firs period to produce on their own and
therefore no technology diffusion occurs in the second period (see Section 4 for
further discussion on this assumption). The technology used by the affiliat will be
the newest available in both periods. Total profit are:
M MP(FDI)5 P (a)1 P (a)2G. (1)1 2] ]
By assumption, exports as well deter imitation by foreign potential entrants.
Notice that the export strategy is only adopted in the firs period because, once the
threat of imitation is over, the patent holder find a licensing contract more
profitabl (by A1). Profit under this regime are therefore:
M MP(EXP)5 P (a)1 P (a). (2)E,1 2] ]
2.2. The LICNEW regime
Proposition 1 fully characterizes this regime.
DProposition 1. If imitation costs are large enough (i.e. I(P, a)>P (a, a)), then inf,2] ] ]
an equilibrium with licensing fir h transfers its newest technology in both
M M* * * *periods. The optimal licensing scheme (T , T ) has T 5P (a) and T 5P (a).1 2 1 1 2 2] ]
Foreign direct investment and exports are never chosen in equilibrium.
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Proof. Note that the licensee would be a monopolist in the F market for both
periods. On the other hand, fir h could extract the whole profit using licensing
fees, since there are many potential identical partners in country F, giving the
licensor full bargaining power.
Lump sum payments are such that the licensee is willing to sign the
13 M Magreement. Therefore, T <P (a) and T <P (a). These inequalities are general-1 1 2 2
14ly called the licensee individual rationality constraints. Also, by reducing the age
of the technology, the total payments become larger. So, fir h sets a5a.]
Therefore, the licensing scheme reported in Proposition 1 satisfie individual
15rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and extracts all (monopoly)
rents generated by the technology in market F. QED
Profit under this regime are then:
M MP(LICNEW)5 P (a)1 P (a). (3)1 2] ]
2.3. The LICOLD regime
Why should fir h be interested in licensing a less efficien version of the
technology? Basically, the incentives of the licensee to imitate depend upon the
profitabilit of the technology that will be reproduced. So, transferring an older
technology will sacrific some rents, but it also deters imitation by the licensee.
Notice that at the beginning of the second period fir h will always transfer its
newest technology to the same licensee or to a new partner, since the game will be
over after period two and imitation is not a threat any longer.
Finally, one needs to answer the following question: why is imitation bad for
the licensor in a world in which it can extract all possible rents generated by the
technology through an appropriate lump sum fee? The answer is straightforward:
first imitation is costly and it wastes some rents; second, imitation substitutes a
more rentable monopoly with a duopoly (by A2).
Under this regime fir h solves the following maximization program:
max T 1T subject to1 2
T ,T ,a1 2
MT < P (a) (4)1 1
13At least, the contract should guarantee the licensee its reservation value. In this framework, the
licensee reservation value is equal to zero at the beginning of each period.
14At the beginning of the second period the technology holder is indifferent between renewing the
contract to the firs period licensee and licensing the technology to another partner. This is because
technology transfer is assumed to be costless. A positive technology transfer cost would imply that the
licensee is the same for both periods.
15 The no-imitation constraint is satisfie by assumption. The licensor incentive compatibility
constraint is automatically satisfie by imposing exclusive licensing contracts.
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MT < P (a) (5)2 2 ]
DI(P, a)> P (a, a). (6)f,2 ]
Constraints (4) and (5) are respectively the licensee individual rationality
constraints for period 1 and 2. Actually, in period 2 the licensor is indifferent
about licensing its technology to the old partner or to a new one. The reservation
value of the firs period licensee is zero, then constraint (4) follows. Analogously,
any licensee in period 2 is willing to accept the contract only if it obtains at least
its reservation value (again equal to zero). Finally, constraint (6) is the no-
16imitation constraint. When imitation takes place, the licensee becomes a
competitor of the licensor’s new partner in period 2. The former will use
¯technology a[[a, a ] and the latter the most advanced technology, a. Therefore if] ]
imitation is more expensive than second period duopoly profits the licensee will
not imitate. Exclusivity of licensing contracts is the assumption that guarantees
that the market structure in the second period can at most be a duopoly. See
discussion in Section 2.5.
This maximization program can be easily solved. Since constraints (4) and (5)
both hold with equality one can substitute them in the objective function which is
then decreasing in a.
¯Proposition 2. There exists an a*[[a, a ] such that, in an equilibrium with]
licensing, imitation is unprofitabl for the licensee when a5a* and imitation is
profitabl when a,a*.
DProof. Defin A;hauI(P, a)>P (a, a)j. Let a*5minha[Aj. Notice that, since Af,2 ]
is closed and, by A5, non-empty, a* always exists. QED
Notice that a* solves the maximization problem of the licensor under this
regime.
Proposition 3. If P9.P then a*(P9),a*(P).
DProof. By A5, I(P9, a).I(P, a), ;a. Then, I(P9, a*(P)).P (a*(P), a). Byf,2 ]
Dcontinuity there exists an a9,a*(P) such that I(P9, a*(P))>P (a9, a). Hence,f,2 ]Da*(P9)5minha[A9j<a9,a*(P) where A9;hauI(P9, a)>P (a, a)j. QEDf,2 ]M M* *Then, from constraints (5) and (4), T 5P (a*) and T 5P (a).1 1 2 2 ]
Finally, total profit under this regime are:
M MP(LICOLD)5 P (a*)1 P (a) (7)1 2 ]
16Notice that it is assumed that imitation does not take place if (6) holds with equality.
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where a* is define by Proposition 2. Recall that by A3 the larger the value of a*
the lower the profit for the licensor in the firs period and hence, given
Proposition 3, profit under this regime are increasing in P.
2.4. The LICIMI regime
In this regime, the licensor anticipates that the licensee will imitate the version
of the technology it has received in the firs period and will produce on its own in
the second period. Therefore, it will extract as much as it can through the firs
period lump sum fee and, in period 2, it will license the technology to another
partner which will become a competitor of the former licensee. There will be two
Dfirm in market F in the second period and their respective profit are P (a , a )h,2 h f
Dand P (a , a ) where subindex f identifie the local competitor and subindex hf,2 f h
fir h’s second period licensee.
To characterize the equilibrium under this regime one has to recall that in the
second period fir h always transfers its newest technology. Therefore, it solves
the following maximization program:
max T 1T subject to (8)1 2
T ,T ,a1 2
M DT < P (a)1 P (a, a)2 I(P, a) (9)1 1 f,2 ]
DT < P (a, a) (10)2 h,2 ]
DI(P, a), P (a, a). (11)f,2 ]
Again, constraint (10) is the individual rationality constraint for the second
period licensee, while (9) is the individual rationality constraint for the former
licensee. Inequality (11) guarantees that imitation takes place.
Since both constraints (9) and (10) hold with equality one can replace them in
the objective function and rewrite the maximization program as follows:
M D Dmax P (a)1 P (a, a)1 P (a, a)2 I(P, a) (12)1 f,2 h,2a ] ]
Dsubject to I(P, a), P (a, a).f,2 ]
Notice that unless one knows the shape of the objective function one cannot
characterize the optimal value of a under this regime. To gain some insights I
focus on the specifi case where the assumption below is satisfied though I shall
illustrate how results extend to the general setting.
M D DA6: P (a)1P (a, a)1P (a, a)2I(P, a) is convex in a.1 f,2 h,2] ]
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Sufficien conditions (but not necessary) for this assumption to hold are that all
profi functions are convex in the own and rival’s age of the technology and
imitation costs are linear in the age of the technology. It is straightforward to
check that the class of models with linear demand, homogenous or differentiated
goods, Cournot competition and constant marginal costs represented by a, satisfie
A6. See Fosfuri (1998) for a parametric example.
DProposition 4. Given A6 and I(P, a),P (a, a), if an equilibrium with imitationf,2] ] ]
exists then it has fir h transfer its newest technology in both periods.
Proof. Assume that an equilibrium with imitation exists. Take any a[(a, a*(P)).]
By A6 and continuity there exists an a9 such that profit are larger under a9 than
under a. So, a cannot be the technology chosen in equilibrium. Hence, an
equilibrium with imitation, if it exists, must be characterized by a5a. QED]
Total profit under this regime are:
M D DP(LICIMI)5 P (a)1 P (a, a)1 P (a, a)2 I(P, a). (13)1 h,2 f,2] ] ] ] ] ]
Notice that I(P, a) enters negatively in expression (13) because, conditional on]
imitation taking place, total rents are larger when imitation costs are smaller (less
resources are wasted in reproducing the technology). In this setting, industry
profit coincide with licensor profits
If A6 does not hold one cannot a priori say too much about the optimal value of
a under this regime. If an equilibrium with imitation exists then it can entail any
value of a[[a, a*(P)] according to the shape of the objective function. In short,]
DProposition 5. If A6 does not hold and I(P,a),P (a, a), then there existf,2] ] ]
parameter configuration under which, in an equilibrium with imitation, fir h
transfers an older version of its technology in the firs period.
This result is interesting in its own right, for it shows that even if imitation does
indeed take place, the licensor might still prefer not to transfer the state-of-the-art
technology. Differently from what happens in the LICOLD regime, a more
obsolete technology is transferred here to weaken the potential competitor in the
second period rather than to reduce the incentives to imitate. In other words, given
that technology disseminates in the second period, the innovator might prefer to
give away some profit today to keep a technological edge over competitors
tomorrow.
2.5. Comparing different regimes
By comparing the profi expressions in (1), (2), (3), (7) and (13) it is easy to
establish the conditions under which a given regime arises as the equilibrium
outcome of the game. Proposition 6 summarizes these conditions:
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17Proposition 6. An equilibrium of the proposed game is the:
D– LICNEW regime if (i) I(P, a)>P (a, a);f,2] ] ]
– FDI regime if (i) is not satisfie , and (ii) G<minhOLD , IMI , E j;1 2 1
– EXP regime if (i) is not satisfie , and (iii) E <minhOLD , IMI , Gj;1 1 2
– LICOLD regime if (i) is not satisfie , and (iv) OLD <minhG, IMI , E j;1 2 1
– LICIMI regime if (i) is not satisfie , and (v) IMI <minhOLD , G, E j;2 1 1
M M M M M Dwhere E 5P (a)2P (a); OLD 5P (a)2P (a*) and IMI 5P (a)2[P (a,1 1 E,1 1 1 1 2 2 f,2] ] ] ] ]Da)1P (a, a)]1I(P, a).h,2] ] ] ]
Notice that the patent holder is able to extract the full rent generated by its
technology only under the firs regime. All other regimes involve some inefficien
cies. The FDI regime requires fixe costs, G, which must be paid in order to be
able to operate across national boundaries; the EXP regime implies a loss, due for
instance to transportation costs, which bears on firs period profits E ; the1
LICOLD regime avoids imitation but the investor has to sacrific some rents in the
firs period, OLD ; finally the LICIMI regime is inefficien both because of the1
‘joint profit effect and because of the waste of resources due to imitation costs,
18IMI .2
Put simply, under threat of imitation the regime which arises at equilibrium is
the one with the smallest inefficiency
Remark 1. The stronger the ‘joint profi ’ effect, the smaller the parameter space
under which the LICIMI regime arises at equilibrium.
As define above, the ‘joint profit effect is stronger when the difference
between monopoly profit and the sum of duopoly profit becomes wider. This
could be due to duopolists competing fiercel against each other (the goods
supplied by the two firm are perfect substitutes) or to economies of scale in
production. Therefore, the inefficienc due to the LICIMI regime will be larger
and hence condition (v) will be more difficul to satisfy. Conversely, when the
‘joint profit effect is weak the LICIMI regime arises at equilibrium for a larger
parameter space.
Notice that the assumption of exclusive licensing contracts implies that the only
possible market structure which arises after imitation has occurred is a duopoly. If
licensing contracts are non-exclusive, both the innovator and fir f might have
incentives to license out the technology to other local firms Hence, competition in
17 If two or more regimes have the same inefficienc (cost), then fir h is indifferent among them. In
this case, unless one specifie a selection mechanism there exist multiple equilibria.
18 If A6 does not hold, and there exists an equilibrium with imitation where a.a, then this regime
]
introduces a third distortion: a reduction in the firs period monopoly profits
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the market for technology might take place, more firm could enter the market in
the second period, and the overall effect would be similar to the one described by
Remark 1. To understand this point, consider the innovator and its licensing
decision in the second period. It can be shown (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1998) that
after imitation has occurred fir h might transfer its technology to two (or more)
19local firm rather than just to one (if licensing contracts are non-exclusive). In
turn, the imitator (fir f ) has also incentives to sell out the technology to other
local firms As a result, firm might compete in licensing and hence contribute to a
larger diffusion of the technology itself.
Finally, notice that this relationship between the ‘joint profit effect and
technology diffusion through imitation, is reminiscent of what emerges in the
literature studying conditions for the persistency of monopolies over time (e.g.
Tirole, 1988; Budd et al., 1993), where the ‘joint profit condition has to be
fulfille in order for the monopolist to keep off potential entrants.
Remark 2. The stronger the degree of patent protection in country F, the larger
(smaller) the parameter space under which the LICNEW (LICIMI) regime arises at
equilibrium.
This is completely intuitive and can be seen from condition (i), which is more
easily satisfie when imitation costs become larger, and condition (v), which is
more stringent since the LHS shrinks and the RHS might increase (because the
LICOLD regime becomes more efficien ). Notice that one cannot uniquely sign the
effect due to a change of P on the other regimes.
Fig. 2 shows how profit under the different regimes depend on P. For
20simplicity, I suppress the export alternative from the graph. On the horizontal
axis I report the degree of patent protection, P, and on the vertical axis the profit
corresponding to the different regimes.
First, notice that when imitation costs are large enough the LICNEW regime
always arises at equilibrium since it allows the patent holder to extract all the rents
from the exploitation of its technology. This occurs for values of P larger (or
equal) than P* where P* is such that condition (i) holds with equality. Notice also
that profit under the LICNEW regime do not depend on the degree of patent
protection in country F. Similarly, profit under the FDI regime are independent of
P. Graphically they correspond to a horizontal line shifted downwards and parallel
to the LICNEW line. The size of such a shift is given by the amount of fixe
set-up costs, G. Profit under the LICIMI regime are the largest for the smallest
19 Formally, let p(N) be the profi of a fir when there are N firm in the market. Firm h marginal
payoff from licensing two firm rather than one in the second period is 2p(3)2p(2), which, depending
on the profi function, can be greater than zero.
20 Profit under the EXP regime would be represented by a horizontal line placed below (above) the
FDI line if P(FDI).P(EXP) (P(FDI),P(EXP)).
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Fig. 2. Changes in regime as a function of P.
level of imitation costs and hence when P50. They decrease progressively for
21positive values of P at a slope given by [≠I(?,?) /≠P]. Finally, profit under the
LICOLD regime become smaller the weaker the patent protection in the foreign
country. This is because when imitation costs are low it is more costly for the
patent holder to avoid imitation (a more inefficien technology must be transferred
in the firs period). Notice that, though I drew it as continuous, the curve
corresponding to the profit under the LICOLD regime might have some
discontinuities.
One interesting comparative statics exercise which I do not work out here (see
Fosfuri, 1998, for details) is with respect to the evolution of the size of demand
across periods. One can show that when the market size is growing (shrinking)
across periods, the parameter space under which licensing with imitation arises at
equilibrium is smaller (larger), while the parameter space under which imitation is
deterred through the use of an older version of the technology is wider (narrower).
Intuitively, this occurs because the inefficienc of the LICOLD regime bears on
21 If A6 does not hold, then profit under this regime are still decreasing in P, though at a different
slope.
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the firs period profit while the costs due to imitation are related to the second
period profits
The following example, drawn from the history of the chemical industry (see
Kudo, 1993), seems to fi well with the story described by the model. It is intended
to be suggestive and illustrative and not thought of as a test of the theory.
After WWI, the German company IG Farben decided to increase its presence in
the growing Japanese market. At the time, the German chemical industry had a
significan competitive edge over Japanese competitors, then at their infant stage,
especially in dyestuffs and nitrogenous fertilizers. To favor the rapid dissemination
of technology the Japanese government promulgated in 1921 a Revised Patent
Law which made chemical material ineligible for patent protection. Thus, in order
for IG Farben to protect its technology it had no choice but to deny licensing to
Japanese firms
Therefore, though both exports and direct investment entailed costs, they were
chosen by IG Farben as entry modes because of their effectiveness in maintaining
the technological leadership. Similarly, my model predicts that either the FDI or
the EXP regime arise at equilibrium (depending on the respective costs) when
patent protection is weak and the ‘joint profit effect is small. Both conditions
seem to hold in the IG Farben example.
Later, when tariffs on exports were raised at prohibitive levels and direct
investment practically banned, IG Farben did change its strategy to one oriented
towards licensing. In terms of my model both exports and direct investment cease
to be a potential entry mode since their costs go to infinity Under these
circumstances, if imitation costs are still high in spite of the weak patent
protection, the LICOLD regime arises at equilibrium, else a LICIMI regime takes
place. While, the latter was clearly the case in the fiel of nitrogenous fertilizers
where at least fiv licensing agreements have been documented and technological
catch-up was almost completed by the end of the 30s, the former occurred in the
fiel of dyestuffs where the transfer of know-how was minimized and the
state-of-the-art technology not licensed, at the cost of a less efficien licensee and,
hence, reduced rents extractable through the licensing fees.
3. Welfare analysis for the host country
A welfare comparison among different regimes in our deterministic framework
is simple. Since the patent holder appropriates all possible rents, welfare in country
F depends on consumer price alone. Therefore, the worst outcome from a welfare
perspective is the LICOLD regime because of the larger monopoly price in the
firs period due to the inefficien technology used by the licensee. The FDI and the
LICNEW regimes give the same welfare to country F. The LICIMI regime, by
introducing competition among firms lowers the consumer price in the second
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period —a result which comes out from almost all models of oligopolistic
22competition —and leads to the best welfare situation for the recipient country.
Finally, the EXP regime cannot be better than the FDI or LICNEW regimes
because of inefficiencie due to transportation costs or higher wages, which
translate into a higher consumer price in the firs period.
Fig. 3 shows country F’s welfare as a function of the degree of patent
protection, P. A change in P influence both the entry mode and the choice of the
technology by fir h. Notice that welfare results are linked to the possible regime
shift induced by a modificatio of the strength of patent protection in country F.
Since the profi ranking of these regimes differs from the welfare ranking (e.g. the
investor might be indifferent between higher fixe costs and lower price, but the
host country is not), there is room for policy interventions.
It is worthwhile emphasizing that welfare in country F is not a decreasing
function of the degree of patent protection as one might expect in a model where
Fig. 3. Changes in welfare as a function of P.
22 If A6 does not hold, welfare results are no longer clear-cut for the LICIMI regime and depend on
the age of the technology transferred in the firs period. Indeed, the beneficia effects due to increased
competition in the second period might be offset by the higher price charged in the firs period.
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technology diffusion only takes place through imitation. Indeed, either strong or
23weak protection are preferred to intermediate levels.
This suggests that a policy aimed to foster technology diffusion through a
reduction of the degree of patent protection might be quite risky if it is not
properly targeted. For instance, suppose that country F’s government wants to
implement the LICIMI regime because it is best from a welfare perspective. One
way to induce it would be to restrict foreign direct investment, raise tariffs and
24decrease I(P, a), by lowering the degree of patent protection. From Fig. 3 it is
clear that, unless this policy reduces imitation costs to a very low level (which
might not be affordable simply through weaker patent protection), the outcome
could well be the licensing of a more obsolete technology and the worst welfare
situation for the host country.
Moreover, the result of such a policy could be even more detrimental to welfare
if the possibility of no investment is also considered. For instance, fir h might
want to earn at least its reservation value, i.e. the returns from an alternative
investment or from a technology transfer to another country. Then, this policy
might end up discouraging any form of technology transfer to country F. One
illustrative example is provided by Vishwasrao (1994). India banned direct
investment by Coca-Cola hoping that the licensing to local firm would result in
the disclosure of the formula used to make the cola drink. But the traditional
weakness of Indian property right protection discouraged the American company
from any investment and Coca-Cola simply decided to leave the market.
4. Robustness
Throughout the paper I have assumed that foreign direct investment avoids
25imitation and, hence, technology diffusion. It has been documented that
23With respect to the standard literature on patent design where the optimal length and scope are set
to balance incentives to generate innovations and the needs to make the innovations widespread, this
result seems surprising. Indeed, since incentives to innovate are not taken into account, a reduction in
the degree of patent protection is expected to increase welfare. But, due to the strategic behavior of the
investor, a decrease in P might instead lead to a lower level of welfare if it raises the age of the
transferred technology.
24 In the IG Farben case discussed in Section 2.5 such a policy was successfully implemented by the
Japanese government and led to the technological catch-up in many chemical fields Given the
relatively high technological level of Japanese firms imitation costs dropped substantially once patent
protection was weakened.
25 Since I focus on process technology this assumption does not seem implausible in the case of
exports.
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sometimes technology diffusion takes place because workers of the multinational
enterprise leave the subsidiary to create their own business or are hired by local
¨competitors (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1996). If one is willing to assume that
imitation costs are larger under direct investment than under licensing, then the
qualitative results would remain unchanged even if such an assumption was
relaxed. To illustrate the point, focus on the case in which imitation is deterred by
the innovator. If imitation costs are larger under direct investment than under
* * *licensing then it must be that a ,a , where a (i5fdi, lic) is define byfdi lic i
Proposition 2. Direct investment remains an alternative to licensing because,
though it entails a fixe cost, it deters imitation through the use of a newer
technology.
For analytical convenience, I assumed that there are only two periods and
afterwards the market completely disappears. Nevertheless, I believe that quali-
tative results are not an artifact of there being just two periods. Though some
modification would occur, the insight provided by the analysis should not change
in an infinite-horizo setting. In particular, in an equilibrium with licensing, there
still exists a technology which makes imitation unprofitabl (by A4) and the
strategic argument put forward in the paper would hold unchanged. Notice that if
one assumes that the size of the demand is shrinking over time and tends to zero
for t that tends to infinity then it is easy to show that a* (as define by Proposition
2) decreases over time.
I assumed that the licensor uses lump sum fees instead of royalties as means of
payment in the licensing contracts. Though in my setting lump sum fees are
preferred to royalties by the licensor, there might be situations in which they are
not feasible (e.g. royalties are imposed by the local regulation). If royalties were
used in the licensing contracts then two changes would take place. First, since a
royalty affects the marginal cost of the licensee, it reduces the total rents
extractable and makes the licensing contract less appealing in general. Second, if
imitation takes place, the licensor cannot extract ex-ante the profit earned by the
firs period licensee in the second period. Hence, the LICIMI regime would arise at
equilibrium for an even smaller part of the parameter space.
Implicitly, I assumed that the licensor and the firs period licensee, after
imitation has occurred, cannot write a contract which commits fir h to a
non-licensing policy in exchange of a given payment. Relaxing this assumption
would not change the normative part of the paper in a fundamental way, though it
modifie the fee that the licensor collects. Further, it would change the implication
on the number of licensees that fir h takes over time.
Finally, I assumed that technology transfer is costless. Qualitative results hold
unchanged if one posits that each time the technology is transferred a fixe cost
must be paid. More specifically the existence of a positive technology transfer
cost makes larger the parameter space under which both the LICIMI and the
LICOLD regimes arise at equilibrium. See Fosfuri (1998) for details.
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5. Conclusions
I have analyzed a model in which a fir endowed with a new technology can
choose between licensing, exports and direct investment as entry modes in a
foreign country. I have also allowed the fir to select the vintage of the
technology to be transferred. In my model, technology diffusion occurs when the
licensee imitates the technology and afterwards produces on its own.
In the absence of imitation, the licensing contract is efficien and optimally
chosen by the innovator. Under the threat of imitation, the innovator has available
different strategies to deter technology diffusion: it can shift to a different entry
mode since both costly exports and direct investment circumvent imitation or it
can license a less efficien version of its technology with the purpose of reducing
the incentives of the licensee to imitate. Since all alternatives involve some costs,
the optimal strategy consists of choosing the one embodying the smallest
inefficiency It turns out that the degree of patent protection in the foreign country
plays an important role because it affects, through a modificatio of imitation
costs, the magnitude of the inefficiencie of the different alternatives.
The regime shift induced by a change in the degree of patent protection has
substantive welfare consequences. I show that the welfare in the host country is
not a decreasing function of the degree of patent protection as one might expect in
a model where technology diffusion only takes place through imitation. Indeed,
either strong or weak protection are preferred to intermediate levels.
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